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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether certain fraudulent 
transfer claims arising from transfers made by Cybergenics 
Corporation were included in a sale of all assets of 
Cybergenics so as to foreclose its creditors from thereafter 
pursuing those claims on behalf of its bankruptcy estate. 
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the sale 
of all of Cybergenics' assets did not encompass these claims 
and we therefore will reverse the District Court's dismissal 
of the creditors' complaint. 
 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court's dismissal of this 
action under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See United States Securities and Exchange 
Comm'n v. Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 186 n. 6 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
Cybergenics, originally known as L&S Research 
Corporation, was a successful marketer of body-building 
and weight loss products under the Cybergenics name. In 
1994, L&S was sold in a leveraged buyout, and the newly 
formed Cybergenics Corporation became burdened with 
more than $60 million of debt that was secured by 
substantially all of Cybergenics' assets.1  In August 1996, 
Cybergenics filed a petition for relief under chapter 11 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, operating as a debtor in possession. 
See 11 U.S.C. SS 1101(1), 1108. 
 
Shortly after filing for bankruptcy, Cybergenics entered 
into an agreement to sell nearly all of its assets to a third 
party for $2.5 million. At the ensuing auction sale, held 
under the auspices of the Bankruptcy Court in October 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The original purchase price was over $110 million, but as the result 
of a settlement of a dispute between the parties, the purchase price was 
later reduced to approximately $60 million. 
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1996, another party who bid $2.65 million was the 
successful purchaser of all Cybergenics' assets. 
 
The sale agreement and the sale order approving the 
1996 asset sale made clear that the purchaser bought"all 
of the rights, title, and interest of Cybergenics in and to all 
of the assets and business as a going concern of 
Cybergenics." App. 77. The sale order provided that the 
acquired assets included, without limitation, a variety of 
categories of business-related property such as trade 
accounts receivable, inventory, and various types of 
intellectual property. The sale order was not appealed and 
the sale was consummated. 
 
Thereafter, Cybergenics moved to dismiss its bankruptcy 
case, averring that dismissal would be in the best interest 
of the bankruptcy estate because it "has no employees, no 
ongoing business operations, has liquidated its assets and 
disbursed the Sale Proceeds, has no ability to reorganize 
and has no estate to administer." App. 202. The chair of 
the Committee of Unsecured Creditors ("Committee") 
objected to the dismissal, contending that the transactions 
comprising the 1994 leveraged buyout should be 
investigated and could give rise to causes of action to avoid 
the transactions that Cybergenics could bring on behalf of 
the bankruptcy estate in its capacity as debtor in 
possession. Although Cybergenics agreed to adjourn its 
motion to dismiss to permit the Committee chair's counsel 
to investigate potential fraudulent transfer claims arising 
from the 1994 leveraged buyout, Cybergenics decided not to 
exercise its power as debtor in possession to pursue such 
an action itself, explaining that it doubted that such 
actions would benefit the bankruptcy estate.2 
 
Based on its investigation, and Cybergenics' refusal to 
pursue these claims, the Committee sought leave from the 
Bankruptcy Court to bring a state law fraudulent transfer 
action on behalf of the bankruptcy estate in Cybergenics' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Cybergenics provided an additional reason for not pursuing claims 
against the other parties to the leveraged buyout, namely, that it already 
had released any claims that Cybergenics itself might have against them 
pursuant to the settlement of a lawsuit it had filed alleging, inter alia, 
fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. 
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stead.3 In opposition, those who would be named 
defendants in the Committee's suit took the position that 
the Committee could not bring the action because the 
claims asserted therein had been sold in the 1996 asset 
sale. The Bankruptcy Court authorized the Committee to 
pursue the fraudulent transfer action without deciding 
whether the underlying claims had been transferred in the 
1996 asset sale; it equivocated on this point, noting that 
"[c]ontrary to the Banks' assertion, the sale of the business 
assets of the Debtor did not necessarily include the sale of 
avoidance rights of the debtor-in-possession." App. 369. In 
March of 1998, the Committee filed its complaint alleging 
that Cybergenics made transfers and incurred obligations 
in connection with the 1994 leveraged buyout that were 
constructively fraudulent under New Jersey law. The 
defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint, 
reiterating their argument that the fraudulent transfer 
claims asserted by the Committee had been sold in the 
1996 asset sale. 
 
The District Court4 granted the defendants' motions and 
dismissed the Committee's complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Opining that the fraudulent transfer 
claims were "property of the estate" under 11 U.S.C. S 541, 
the District Court concluded that Cybergenics had sold 
them to the purchaser in the 1996 asset sale. The District 
Court reasoned that the concept of "property of the estate" 
under section 541(a) includes causes of action existing at 
the time a petition for bankruptcy relief is filed. The District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Only a trustee (or debtor in possession) is authorized to exercise the 
power to avoid certain transfers or obligations. However, as the 
Bankruptcy Court explained in this case, see App. 362, courts have at 
times authorized individual creditors or creditors' committees to exercise 
avoidance powers under certain circumstances, particularly when the 
debtor in possession is unwilling to pursue a colorable claim that would 
benefit the bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., Canadian Pacific Forest Prods., 
Ltd. v. J.D. Irving, Ltd. (In re Gibson Group, Inc.) , 66 F.3d 1436, 1438 
(6th 
Cir. 1995). 
 
4. The District Court resolved the motion instead of the Bankruptcy 
Court because the District Court withdrew the reference of this 
proceeding from the Bankruptcy Court. See 28 U.S.C. 157(a), (d). 
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Court decided as well that fraudulent transfer claims were 
in the nature of contract claims, as opposed to tort claims, 
and therefore were assignable. Thus, the District Court 
concluded that the Committee's complaint must be 
dismissed because the claims asserted therein had been 
sold to the successful purchaser in the 1996 asset sale. 
 
Discussion 
 
To resolve this appeal, we must determine whether the 
fraudulent transfer claims asserted in the action dismissed 
by the District Court were, in fact, transferred in the 1996 
asset sale, and, accordingly, must construe the sale order 
in accordance with its terms. The Bankruptcy Court's order 
authorized and directed Cybergenics to "sell and transfer 
the assets under the Agreement" to the purchaser, and set 
forth a nonexhaustive list of examples, which included 
business-related assets such as trade accounts receivable, 
inventory, fixed assets, and various types of intellectual 
property. It noted further that "any references in the 
Agreement or in the Schedules attached thereto to any 
assets to be excluded from the sale are hereby deleted as it 
is acknowledged that all of the assets of the Debtor[defined 
to include Cybergenics as debtor and debtor in possession] 
are being conveyed to the Purchaser." App. 187. Like the 
sale order, the underlying sale agreement referred to the 
sale of all assets of Cybergenics as debtor and debtor in 
possession. 
 
Our reading of these documents, which clearly 
authorized the sale of all assets of Cybergenics, directs our 
focus to one inquiry: were fraudulent transfer claims, which 
arose from transfers made and obligations incurred by 
Cybergenics in the 1994 leveraged buyout, assets of 
Cybergenics? If not, the 1996 asset sale is not an 
impediment to the Committee's lawsuit.5  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We will restrict our discussion to this one issue because we view it as 
dispositive. We reject Appellees' other arguments-- namely, that the 
claim is barred by one or more of the following: res judicata, releases 
previously given, absence of an actual creditor who could avoid the 
transfer, impropriety of collapsing the transaction, and existence of a 
recoupment defense -- because they lack merit and do not warrant 
discussion. 
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Determining the "ownership" of a claim or cause of action 
would seem to be a relatively straightforward inquiry 
requiring that we evaluate the nature of the cause of action 
at issue. However, the overlay of bankruptcy complicates 
our analysis. Thus, we will explore the nature of the 
fraudulent transfer claim, but we also will review 
fundamental bankruptcy principles regarding the status 
and powers of the debtor in possession in relationship to 
such a claim, including the legal fiction -- the avoidance 
power provided in 11 U.S.C. S 544(b) -- that enables a 
debtor in possession to bring certain causes of action that 
actually belong to its creditors. 
 
Fraudulent Transfer Action 
 
The Committee's complaint challenges transfers that 
Cybergenics made to the defendants, and obligations that 
Cybergenics incurred for the defendants' benefit, in 
connection with the 1994 leveraged buyout. The complaint 
accordingly seeks recovery from the defendants based on 
New Jersey fraudulent transfer law. If state law provided 
that this cause of action actually belonged to, and inured to 
the benefit of, the transferor, Cybergenics, we might readily 
conclude that it was Cybergenics' asset and was sold in the 
1996 asset sale. However, that is not the case. As we 
explain below, fraudulent transfer claims have long 
belonged to a transferor's creditors, whose efforts to collect 
their debts have essentially been thwarted as a 
consequence of the transferor's actions, and that tradition 
continues today. 
 
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, as adopted into 
New Jersey law, authorizes Cybergenics' creditors to seek 
avoidance of a fraudulent transfer or obligation that it has 
made to or incurred for the benefit of a third party.6 One 
provision, for example, which addresses transfers and 
obligations that may be fraudulent as to present and future 
creditors, states as follows: 
 
       A transfer made or an obligation incurred by a debtor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Other remedies are available as well in addition to avoidance, such as 
attachment or other provisional remedies against the asset transferred. 
See N.J. STAT. ANN.S 25:2-29. 
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       is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's 
       claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the 
       obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer 
       or incurred the obligation . . . 
 
N.J. STAT. ANN. S 25:2-25 (emphasis added).7 
 
This creditors' remedy is age-old. See Orr v. Kinderhill 
Corp., 991 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Twyne's 
Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601)); Barry L. 
Zaretsky, The Fraudulent Transfer Law as the Arbiter of 
Unreasonable Risk, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1168 (1995) 
(citations omitted) (explaining that fraudulent transfer law 
started as part creditor protection and part criminal law, 
but evolved into a law primarily for creditor protection). See 
generally Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 43 
(1989) (tracing the history of fraudulent transfer actions to 
determine whether they historically were considered actions 
at law or at equity). A preeminent scholar in this area of the 
law emphasized the creditor focus of fraudulent transfers 
as he commenced his well-known treatise: 
 
       The fraudulent conveyance, as known in our law, may 
       be roughly defined as an infringement of the creditor's 
       right to realize upon the available assets of his debtor. 
       That, and none other, is the meaning that should 
       attach to the word "fraud," as used in the synonymous 
       term, "conveyance in fraud of creditors." It follows that 
       an appreciation of this form of wrongdoing involves, 
       first of all, a clear understanding of the right which is 
       impaired. 
 
GARRARD GLENN, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES S 1 
(1931). See also; PETER A. ALCES, THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT 
TRANSACTIONS P 1.01[2] at 1-3, P 5.04 at 5-112 (1989) 
(citations omitted). The precise requirements for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Similarly, a provision addressing transfers that may be fraudulent as 
to only present creditors also states: 
 
       A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as 
       to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the 
       obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred 
       the obligation . . . 
 
N.J. STAT. ANN. S 25:2-27(a) (emphasis added). See also id.SS 25:2-27(b). 
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successfully alleging that a transfer or obligation is 
fraudulent have evolved over time, see United States v. 
Green, 201 F.3d 251, 254 (3d Cir. 2000), but the 
fundamental creditors' rights premise, reflected in New 
Jersey's enactment of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 
has not. 
 
Thus, at least outside of the context of bankruptcy, it is 
clear that a fraudulent transfer claim arising from 
Cybergenics' transfers and obligations belongs to 
Cybergenics' creditors, not to Cybergenics. Other applicable 
nonbankruptcy laws may give Cybergenics various causes 
of action with which to challenge its own transactions and 
obligations, but a fraudulent transfer action is not among 
them. Having established this, we will examine if the 
answer changes when the transferor becomes a chapter 11 
debtor in possession. 
 
Status and Duties of a Debtor in Possession and the 
Avoidance Powers 
 
There would be no appeal before us were it not for the 
fact that the Bankruptcy Code empowers trustees as well 
as chapter 11 debtors in possession to avoid transfers as 
fraudulent using causes of action that state law provides to 
creditors. Does this mean that the chapter 11 debtor in 
possession actually acquires its creditors' fraudulent 
transfer claims against third parties as a result offiling for 
bankruptcy? As explained below, the answer is clearly "no." 
 
The term "debtor in possession" refers to a debtor in a 
chapter 11 case for which no trustee has been appointed. 
See 11 U.S.C. S 1101(1). When no trustee is appointed, the 
Bankruptcy Code gives a debtor in possession the powers 
and duties of a trustee. Id. S 1107(a); FED. R. BANKR. P. 
9001(10). See also In re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 
140 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 1998). The terms "trustee" and 
"debtor in possession," as used in the Bankruptcy Code, 
are thus essentially interchangeable. See L.R.S.C. Co. v. 
Rickel Home Centers, Inc. (In re Rickel Home Centers, Inc.), 
209 F.3d 291, 297 & n. 7 (3d Cir. 2000). Hence, by virtue 
of being a debtor in possession, Cybergenics operated not 
only as a business entity, but essentially as a trustee as 
well. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 
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471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (citing Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 
633, 649-652 (1963)). 
 
A paramount duty of a trustee or debtor in possession in 
a bankruptcy case is to act on behalf of the bankruptcy 
estate, that is, for the benefit of the creditors. See Marvel, 
140 F.3d at 471, 473-474. See generally Weintraub, 471 
U.S. at 352. To fulfill this duty, trustees and debtors in 
possession have a variety of statutorily created powers, 
known as avoidance powers, which enable them to recover 
property on behalf of the bankruptcy estate. 
 
Section 544(b) is the operative avoidance power at issue 
here. Specifically, this provision authorizes the avoidance of 
"any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or any 
obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under 
applicable law by a creditor holding an [allowable] 
unsecured claim." 11 U.S.C. S 544(b) (emphasis added). The 
avoidance power provided in section 544(b) is distinct from 
others because a trustee or debtor in possession can use 
this power only if there is an unsecured creditor of the 
debtor that actually has the requisite nonbankruptcy cause 
of action.8 Yet, once avoidable pursuant to this provision, 
the transfer is avoided in its entirety for the benefit of all 
creditors, not just to the extent necessary to satisfy the 
individual creditor actually holding the avoidance claim. 
See Moore v. Bay (In re Sassard & Kimball, Inc.), 284 U.S. 
4, 5 (1931). See also 11 U.S.C. S 551 (automatically 
preserving an avoided transfer for the benefit of the estate). 
 
The fact that section 544(b) authorizes a debtor in 
possession, such as Cybergenics, to avoid a transfer using 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code also authorizes a trustee (or 
debtor in possession) to avoid fraudulent transfers and obligations, and, 
unlike section 544(b), is not contingent upon the identification of an 
actual unsecured creditor with a state law cause of action. However, 
among other differences, section 548 can be used to avoid only transfers 
or obligations by the debtor that were made or incurred on or within one 
year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Thus, the District 
Court 
determined that a fraudulent transfer action arising from transfers and 
obligations associated with the 1994 leveraged buyout could not be 
pursued under section 548 and the Committee did not appeal that 
determination. 
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a creditor's fraudulent transfer action does not mean that 
the fraudulent transfer action is actually an asset of the 
debtor in possession, nor should it be confused with the 
separate authority of a trustee or debtor in possession to 
pursue the prepetition debtor's causes of action that 
become property of the estate upon the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition. See, e.g., Sender v. Simon, 84 F.3d 
1299, 1304 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining the difference 
between these separate grants of authority). Rather, it 
simply enables a debtor in possession to carry out its 
trustee-related duties. 
 
The power to avoid the debtor's prepetition transfers and 
obligations to maximize the bankruptcy estate for the 
benefit of creditors has been called a "legalfiction" by one 
court. See Zilkha Energy Co. v. Leighton, 920 F.2d 1520, 
1523 (10th Cir. 1990). It puts the debtor in possession "in 
the overshoes" of a creditor. See Benjamin Weintraub and 
Alan N. Resnick, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL P 7.04, 7-15 (3d 
Ed. 1992) (quoting Schneider v. O'Neal, 243 F.2d 914, 918 
(8th Cir. 1957)). This attribute is no more an asset of 
Cybergenics as debtor in possession than it would be a 
personal asset of a trustee, had one been appointed in this 
case. Much like a public official has certain powers upon 
taking office as a means to carry out the functions 
bestowed by virtue of the office or public trust, the debtor 
in possession is similarly endowed to bring certain claims 
on behalf of, and for the benefit of, all creditors. 
 
As further evidence that the avoidance powers neither 
shift ownership of the fraudulent transfer action to the 
debtor in possession, nor are themselves a debtor's assets, 
we note that courts have limited a debtor's exercise of 
avoidance powers to circumstances in which such actions 
would in fact benefit the creditors, not the debtors 
themselves. See, e.g., Wellman v. Wellman (In re Wellman), 
933 F.2d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
avoidance powers provide for recovery only if the recovery is 
for the benefit of the estate); Vintero Corp. v. Corporacion 
Venezolana (In re Vintero Corp.), 735 F.2d 740, 742 (2d Cir. 
1984) ("Vintero was given the right to avoid CVF 's security 
interest in order to protect such third parties, not to create 
a windfall for Vintero itself . . . To the extent that other 
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creditors of Vintero are not affected adversely by 
enforcement of CVF 's security interest, there is no reason 
why such interest should not be enforced."). 9 Rather than 
improving the debtor's own bottom line, empowering the 
trustee or debtor in possession to avoid a transaction by 
pursuing an individual creditor's cause of action is a 
method of forcing that creditor to share its valuable right 
with other unsecured creditors. See Thomas H. Jackson, 
Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 749 
(1984); Charles Jordan Tabb, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY S 6.2 at 
336 (1997); American Nat'l Bank of Austin v. 
MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.) , 714 
F.2d 1266, 1278 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the automatic 
stay prevents an individual creditor from pursuing an 
avoidance action for its own exclusive benefit rather than 
for the benefit of all creditors, noting that"the principle of 
first-come-first-served has no place in bankruptcy law 
except to the very limited extent that specific provisions 
give it a place"). The use of this authorization for the benefit 
of creditors is at the heart of the avoiding powers. 
 
Appellees urge that we should conclude that Cybergenics 
did, in fact, sell the right to pursue the claim in the 1996 
asset sale based on their interpretation of cases from other 
courts, including one of our sister courts of appeals, 
involving express assignments of avoidance powers to third 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The trustee's power to assert a creditor's state law fraudulent 
transfer 
action through section 544(b) stands in sharp contrast to other statutory 
entitlements in the Bankruptcy Code that do work to the direct benefit 
of the debtor, not the creditors. One prime example is section 522(f) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, which permits an individual debtor to avoid 
certain liens on household goods to the extent that they impair the 
debtor's property exemption. While debtor protection is the express goal 
of provisions such as section 522(f), bolstering creditors' rights is the 
primary objective of avoidance powers such as section 544(b). See 
Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy , 36 STAN. L. REV. 
725, 730 n. 16 (1984). See generally Citicorp Acceptance Co. v. Robison 
(In re Sweetwater), 884 F.2d 1323, 1329 (10th Cir. 1989) ("All of the 
avoiding powers have the policy of fair treatment among creditors at 
their base. . . . The theoretical underpinning of all of them remains the 
equal treatment among creditors by forcing those who have received an 
unfair advantage to disgorge the ill gotten gains.") (citing R. Aaron, 
BANKRUPTCY LAW FUNDAMENTALS S 10.01 (Rev'd 1999)). 
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parties. In Briggs v. Kent (In re Professional Inv. Properties 
of America), 955 F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1992), the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated it was faced with the 
issue of whether a trustee's so-called strong-arm powers 
provided by section 544(a) were "transferrable" to a creditor 
who purchased the estate's right to certain sale proceeds. 
The Court then decided, however, that "if a creditor is 
pursuing interests common to all creditors or is appointed 
for purposes of enforcement of the plan [of reorganization], 
he may exercise the trustee's avoidance powers." Id. at 626 
(emphasis added). This holding was reaffirmed and 
extended to the context of a chapter 7 case in Duckor 
Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177 
F.3d 774, 782 (9th Cir. 1999).10 Appellees cite these cases 
as standing for the proposition that avoidance powers may 
be sold. We do not necessarily agree with their assessment 
of these cases, but we need not reach this issue because 
the 1996 transaction was not an assignment of avoidance 
powers (or even an authorization of the right to exercise the 
avoidance powers), but rather, it was a sale of Cybergenics' 
"assets."11 As we have already determined, neither the 
fraudulent transfer claim nor the avoidance power was an 
asset of Cybergenics. Clearly, therefore, that fact pattern 
bears no resemblance to the situation in the instant case. 
We similarly find little relevance in the cases cited by the 
parties from various courts of appeals that deal with the 
appointment of estate representatives in a plan of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In P.R.T.C., the Court of Appeals upheld an express assignment to 
the debtor's largest creditor to pursue a variety of claims and rights 
actionable under Bankruptcy Code sections 541 through 552 arising out 
of a series of specified transactions. Id. at 776. The trustees proposed 
the assignment after concluding that the estate lacked sufficient funds 
to pursue those claims or rights, but believed that they might have 
significant value. The creditor was required by the agreement to remit to 
the bankruptcy estate 50% of the net proceeds in the event that the 
creditor pursued the claims. 
 
11. Had the sale order explicitly provided for the assignment of the 
avoidance powers, we would have no occasion to scrutinize its legality at 
this juncture, as the sale order was never appealed and has long since 
been consummated. See Pittsburgh Food and Beverage, Inc. v. Ranallo, 
112 F.3d 645, 650 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
                                13 
  
reorganization based on section 1123(b)(3)(B) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.12 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we reach the 
inescapable conclusion that the fraudulent transfer claims, 
which state law provided to Cybergenics' creditors, were 
never assets of Cybergenics, and this conclusion is not 
altered by the fact that a debtor in possession is 
empowered to pursue those fraudulent transfer claims for 
the benefit of all creditors. The avoidance power itself, 
which we have analogized to the power of a public official 
to carry out various responsibilities in a representative 
capacity, was likewise not an asset of Cybergenics, just as 
this authority would not have been a personal asset of a 
trustee, had one been appointed. Thus, we conclude that 
the fraudulent transfer claims asserted in the Committee's 
complaint were not sold in the 1996 asset sale. 
 
Although it is not a basis for our reasoning or result, we 
note that if the fraudulent transfer claim had been an asset 
of Cybergenics, it should have been reflected as an asset on 
Cybergenics' bankruptcy schedules. It was not so listed. 
See Voluntary Petition of Cybergenics, 96-37203 Schedule 
B.13 It is also curious that there is no evidence in the record 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Section 11 U.S.C. S 1123(b)(3)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a 
plan of reorganization to designate a representative to enforce certain 
claims, such as avoidance claims, for the estate's benefit. See, e.g., 
Retail 
Marketing Co. v. King (In re Mako, Inc.), 985 F.2d 1052, 1055-1056 (10th 
Cir. 1993) (refusing to allow a "stranger to the estate" to bring an 
avoidance action without clear evidence of the reservation of the 
avoidance power for that party and explaining that postconfirmation 
avoidance actions are to be exercised for the benefit of all creditors); 
Citicorp Acceptance Co. v. Robison (In re Sweetwater), 884 F.2d 1323, 
1327-1328 (10th Cir. 1989); McFarland v. Leyh (In re Texas General 
Petroleum Corp.), 52 F.3d 1330, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995). The instant appeal 
clearly involves no plan of reorganization and there is no suggestion that 
the purchaser of Cybergenics' assets is acting as, or wishes to be 
appointed to act as, a representative of the estate in any event. 
 
13. It also was not contained on the Statement of Financial Affairs list 
of 
all suits to which the debtor is or was a party within one year preceding 
the bankruptcy filing, although that list includes only those lawsuits 
that actually have been filed, not inchoate lawsuits. See Statement of 
Financial Affairs at 8. 
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that the successful purchaser of Cybergenics' assets ever 
took the position that he bought the fraudulent transfer 
claims or the power to avoid the transfers provided by the 
Bankruptcy Code.14 
 
Our reasoning and conclusion are different from that of 
the District Court. In considering the nature of the 
fraudulent transfer claims, the District Court focused on 
when they arose and whether they were transferrable as a 
general matter, but did not consider the determinative 
issue of whether they ever belonged to Cybergenics in the 
first place. The District Court also concentrated on whether 
the fraudulent transfer claims were "property of the estate," 
a term of art under the Bankruptcy Code, see 11 U.S.C. 
S 541(a), notwithstanding the fact that the sale order and 
sale agreement authorized the sale of all assets of 
Cybergenics, not all property of Cybergenics' bankruptcy 
estate. "Cybergenics' assets" and "property of the estate" 
have different meanings, evidenced in part by the 
numerous provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that 
distinguish between property of the estate and property of 
the debtor, or refer to one but not the other.15 See also In 
re Doemling, 127 B.R. 954, 957 (W.D. Pa. 1991) 
("Obviously, after the commencement of the case, the estate 
has an existence that is completely separate from that of 
the debtor."); Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the 
Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY L. J. 1193, 1215 n. 94 (1998). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Neither Cybergenics nor the purchaser is a party to this appeal. 
 
15. Examples include sections 362(a)(3), (4) & (5) (separately protecting 
property of the debtor and property of the estate with the automatic 
stay), section 541(a)(7) (providing that property of the estate includes 
interests in property acquired by the estate itself following the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case), section 543(a) (preventing a 
custodian from taking action in the administration of property of the 
debtor or property of the estate), and section 552(a) (limiting effect of 
security interests in property acquired postpetition by the estate or by 
the debtor). Further bolstering this distinction by negative implication, 
property of the estate is separately and distinctly defined for purposes 
of 
chapter 9 municipal bankruptcy cases to mean property of the debtor. 
11 U.S.C. S 902(1). See also id. S 1306(a) (defining property of the 
estate, 
for purposes of chapter 13 only, to include the debtor's postpetition 
earnings). 
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Issues relating to property of the estate are simply not 
relevant to the inquiry into whether the fraudulent transfer 
claims in the Committee's complaint were assets of 
Cybergenics as debtor or debtor in possession.16 
Accordingly, we reject the District Court's analysis and 
conclusion. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will REVERSE the order of 
the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Even if we agreed that an analysis of property of the estate was 
necessary to resolve this dispute, our outcome would not change due to 
the cause of action at issue here. Subject to a few specifically 
enumerated exceptions, the bankruptcy estate contains only the 
interests of the debtor in property as of the time of the bankruptcy 
filing, 
"no more, no less." In re Jones, 768 F.2d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(citation omitted). As we already have explained, the fraudulent transfer 
action belonged to Cybergenics' creditors as of the time of the 
bankruptcy filing. It bears emphasis that we focus here on the cause of 
action to avoid the transfer, not on any sort of"equitable interest" that 
some courts have said may be retained by a debtor in fraudulently- 
transferred property. See, e.g., Cullen Center Bank & Trust v. Hensley (In 
re Criswell), 102 F.3d 1411, 1417 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Mortgage 
America, 714 F.2d at 1275). That issue is not before us in this case, and 
we must take care not to conflate these two distinct questions. In 
addition, although at least one Bankruptcy Court-- and the very judge 
who presided over Cybergenics' bankruptcy case -- has stated that the 
avoidance power provided by the Bankruptcy Code is, itself, property of 
the estate, see In re Becker, 136 B.R. 113, 116 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1992), 
this is hardly a universally accepted view. See, e.g., In re Saunders, 101 
B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989); 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY P 541.14 
n. 1 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 1999) (stating that avoiding powers are not 
property of the estate, but, rather, statutorily created powers to recover 
property). 
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